The Forensics Aspects of Event Data Recorders by Daily, Jeremy S. et al.
Journal of Digital Forensics, 
Security and Law 
Volume 3 Number 3 Article 2 
2008 
The Forensics Aspects of Event Data Recorders 
Jeremy S. Daily 
University of Tulsa 
Nathan Singleton 
University of Tulsa 
Elizabeth Downing 
Digital Forensics Professionals, Inc. 
Gavin W. Manes 
Digital Forensics Professionals, Inc. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.erau.edu/jdfsl 
 Part of the Computer Engineering Commons, Computer Law Commons, Electrical and Computer 
Engineering Commons, Forensic Science and Technology Commons, and the Information Security 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Daily, Jeremy S.; Singleton, Nathan; Downing, Elizabeth; and Manes, Gavin W. (2008) "The Forensics 
Aspects of Event Data Recorders," Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law: Vol. 3 : No. 3 , Article 2. 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15394/jdfsl.2008.1044 
Available at: https://commons.erau.edu/jdfsl/vol3/iss3/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by 
the Journals at Scholarly Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Digital Forensics, 
Security and Law by an authorized administrator of 
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please 
contact commons@erau.edu. 
(c)ADFSL 
Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 3(3) 
 
29 
 
The Forensics Aspects of Event Data Recorders 
Jeremy S. Daily 
University of Tulsa 
600 S. College Ave. 
Tulsa, OK 74104 
918-631-3056 
jeremy-daily@utulsa.edu 
  
Nathan Singleton 
University of Tulsa 
600 S. College Ave. 
Tulsa, OK 74104 
918-631-3056 
nathan-singleton@utulsa.edu  
 
Elizabeth Downing 
Digital Forensics Professionals, Inc. 
401 S. Boston Ave. Ste. 1701 
Tulsa, OK 74103 
918-856-5337 
Beth.downing@dfpinc.com 
  
Gavin W. Manes* 
Digital Forensics Professionals, Inc. 
401 S. Boston Ave. Ste. 1701 
Tulsa, OK 74103 
918-856-5337 
Gavin.manes@dfpinc.com 
 
*to whom correspondence should be addressed 
 
ABSTRACT 
The proper generation and preservation of digital data from Event Data Recorders 
(EDRs) can provide invaluable evidence to automobile crash reconstruction 
investigations. However, data collected from the EDR can be difficult to use and 
authenticate, complicating the presentation of such information as evidence in 
legal proceedings. Indeed, current techniques for removing and preserving such 
data do not meet the court’s standards for electronic evidence. Experimentation 
with an EDR unit from a 2001 GMC Sierra pickup truck highlighted particular 
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issues with repeatability of results. Fortunately, advances in the digital forensics 
field and memory technology can be applied to EDR analysis in order to provide 
more complete and usable data. The presented issues should assist in the 
identification and development of a model for forensically sound collection and 
investigation techniques for EDRs.  
Keywords: Event Data Recorder, Digital Forensics, Evidence Production, Civil 
Procedure, Crash Reconstruction  
1. INTRODUCTION 
Event Data Recorders (EDRs) can provide a wealth of data regarding automobile 
accidents, including the vehicle’s speed at the time of the accident, engine RPM at 
the time of accident, braking information, airbag deployment, and more. 
Increasingly, this information is being used to supplement physical evidence by 
accident reconstruction professionals. To date, most research concerning EDRs has 
focused on the use of data coming from the recorder and its relevance to physical 
events rather than the process of collecting data from it [3]. Given the attention to 
electronic evidence in the modern court system, this is a very important step of the 
process of gathering information for use in court. Therefore, independently 
assessing issues regarding data integrity, security, and reliability is needed to 
maintain the proper forensic qualities of the digital data stored on event data 
recorders. 
Since there are no laws mandating the use of EDRs, their presence and capabilities 
vary widely between automobile manufacturers and models. Most EDRs are a part 
of a vehicle’s restraint system (i.e., the seatbelts or airbags) and help “decide” 
when the restraints are deployed. Note that an EDR is not necessary for an airbag 
system to operate, and some cars do not contain them. Regardless of whether the 
restraint systems were deployed, EDRs can record any of the following: (1) pre-
crash vehicle performance data and system status; (2) accelerations during the 
crash; (3) safety restraint system use; and (4) driver control inputs. There are 
instances where a loss of power to the module can result in no data being available 
for a particular accident. As automotive and EDR technologies advance, additional 
data will be collected and new requirements will be mandated by regulatory 
agencies.  
Once a crash has occurred, the data must be retrieved from the EDR module. All 
current methods of this data retrieval are proprietary: the Bosch Crash Data 
Retrieval Tool (CDR) is used on vehicles from GM, Ford, Chrysler, and certain 
partner companies, while Hexadecimal Translation Tools (HTT) are produced by 
the EDR manufacturers.  For the purposes of this paper, only light vehicle EDRs 
are being discussed, since heavy trucks utilize entirely different systems and 
setups. 
1.1 Modern Event Data Recorders 
As of 2008, Bosch produces the only third party tool capable of obtaining and 
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interpreting data stored in EDRs. The three US automotive companies have 
licensing agreements in place with Bosch, and therefore have the most easily 
obtainable crash data. Data can be recovered on some GM vehicles as far back as 
1994. 
The Sensing and Diagnostic Module (which is GM’s air bag module) records crash 
related information by placing volatile memory within a data loop through which 
the information of interest passes. When an accident or other catastrophic event 
occurs, the computer automatically writes the last five seconds of data from 
volatile to solid-state memory, where it can be downloaded and investigated by 
proprietary cables and software. A good explanation of this process can be found 
in Chidester, et al [1]. 
Due to the increased inclusion of computers in automobiles for operational 
purposes, there is a large amount of untapped data that could be collected. 
Advances in memory technology also allow for greater storage capacities, which 
could result from an increased number of inputs or a larger time span of collected 
data. Furthermore, forensics professionals have identified areas in which digital 
systems controlling the vehicle could be infiltrated and compromised [9]. 
Detecting traces of such activity through the digital record could be a crucial 
component of an investigation. 
Since many different types of EDR’s exist for light vehicles, concerns exist 
regarding standards for data recording, reporting, storage, and transfer. The Society 
of Automotive Engineers (SAE) has established the J1698 technical committee, 
“Vehicle Event Data Interface (VEDI)” to examine EDR standardization issues. 
Concurrently, the Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) joined 
with NHSTA to form working groups IEEE 1616 to discuss issues regarding 
tamper proof and crash proof electronics [7]. In addition to these voluntary 
standards, NHTSA has released rules regarding EDRs. 
1.1 Event Data Recorder Regulations 
The standards and definitions of EDRs are determined by the NHTSA’s Title 49 
CFR Part 563, which was published as a Final Rule in early 2008.  This rule 
requires that tools for accessing and retrieving the data be commercially available 
for model year 2011 vehicles. This rule also defines a minimal data set that must 
be recorded and the data elements to be stored.  
Currently, there are no standards concerning the collection of information stored in 
other locations, such as the anti-lock brake system (ABS).  The NHSTA has stated 
that it will consider other sources of data in vehicles once Part 563 has been 
finalized.      
2. CRASH DATA RETRIEVAL (CDR) TOOL  
The Bosch CDR is the only publicly available product capable of downloading 
data from an EDR.  This system was developed in participation with GM, and has 
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licensing agreements with GM, Ford, and Chrysler. At present, the CDR is only 
capable of downloading data from select vehicles manufactured since 1994. 
Vehicles not included in this set can still be investigated through the examination 
of persistent memory, a common feature in Electronic Control Modules (ECMs).  
Many of these ECMs are used to control various systems in the car, such as 
antilock brakes, powertrain and engine management, airbag deployment, etc. 
Although not centralized, data from ECMs can be accessed and recovered for use 
in crash reconstruction.  
The tools used in this process are all closed source, including the collection, 
interfacing, file formatting, and decoding procedures. Therefore, independent 
verification of the software, its applications, and decoding is difficult. No official 
statement has been made by Bosch in response to inquiries regarding some of the 
procedural questions that arise during use and experimentation with this tool. To 
demonstrate these complexities, the following section provides a brief introduction 
to the tool, its use, and where it seems data is interpreted. Issues arising from its 
use are discussed in Section 3. 
Note that all of the following information represents an investigation performed on 
an EDR from a 2001 GMC Sierra 1500 pickup truck using the Bosch CDR 2.8 
software. This vehicle had been involved in a head-on collision in 2003, and the 
following experiment was performed on the EDR which mimicked the process that 
would occur post-crash by an accident investigator. The data was retrieved from 
the EDR using the CDR Interface Module and all information was output to a .cdr 
file. This process was repeated several times, both in part and as a whole, and each 
step was analyzed with regard to the ability to repeat, verify, and authenticate the 
data. Note that vehicles with other EDRs or software versions may return different 
results. 
2.1 Using the CDR Tool 
There are several operations that must occur in the investigation of an EDR, 
beginning with its connection to a CDR Interface Module and a “collections” 
computer (see Figure 1).  These connections are made through a combination of 
proprietary and standard cabling. Connection of the EDR can be accomplished 
either through the diagnostic ports under the dashboard (which is only possible if 
vehicle power can be restored), or through direct access. The latter typically 
requires disassembly of the car’s interior. 
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Figure 1 – A schematic showing an example CDR/EDR connection. 
2.2 CDR and EDR Communication  
Once connected, CDR software communicates with the serial communications 
port, checks for the presence of a CDR Interface Module and then begins a new 
case.   Then, the investigator must enter case-specific information such as the 
Vehicle Identification Number (VIN), investigation date, etc. 
After such information has been entered, the CDR software begins performing its 
functions, and data is exchanged between the CDR, EDR, and collections 
computer.  The initial signal from the CDR software is the hexadecimal code 53 56 
47 10, and the EDR responds with the code 88 59 91 17 00 00 77: the 91 17 
sequence corresponds to the specific model and version of the EDR. This 
hexadecimal information dictates the cable to be used, specific commands needed, 
and setup requirements for the CDR Tool. 
After the EDR model information is obtained, the CDR sends a dump command, 
which downloads the nonvolatile memory from the EDR into the CDR Interface 
Module. Completion of this process is indicated when the sequence D0 56 47 93 is 
sent to the CDR software. At this point, the information is stored in volatile 
memory on the CDR Interface Module.  The CDR software then sends a command 
to ship approximately half of the downloaded data for processing: it is unknown 
why the data is downloaded in two separate stages.  The following hexadecimal 
data is returned from the EDR:  
EF D6 01 91 17 00 00 A7 18 41 53 30 33 34 30 4B 
46 33 42 39 32 00 15 76 31 80 A3 A5 A4 F8 AC 00 
03 A4 34 80 83 81 85 70 FF 00 FA FA FA FA FA FA 
FA FA FA FA FA FA FA FA FF 02 00 00 00 FF FF FF 
FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF 
FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF 
FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF 
FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF 
FF FF FF 81 
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The beginning of file, EF D6 01, and the end of file, 81, are appended to the data in 
the CDR Interface Module. Following the appended header, the EDR type 
identifier code (91 17) is again displayed. After the first portion of the data is 
received, a request for the rest of the download is sent. The CDR Interface Module 
sends the second half of the information as follows: 
EF B4 01 FF FF FF FF FF FF 80 00 00 FF 80 FE FF 
BF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF 7C 04 03 01 01 
02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 FF FF FF FF FF 0A 10 
00 61 70 70 6E 6C 6A 00 80 00 00 73 73 73 73 00 
20 20 20 20 20 00 F8 25 FE 00 00 00 04 00 FF FF 
FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF 
FF 98  
 
Here, the sequence EF B4 01 is used for the beginning of file marker and 98 is the 
end of file marker, both of which are appended to the data by the CDR Interface 
Module.   
The entire retrieval process, beginning with the CDR sending the EDR a dump 
command, is repeated twice more. Although the reason for the repetition is not 
known, this could represent an attempt to compare data due to discrepancies that 
occur between passes. Once the CDR software completes the retrieval process, it 
analyzes the EDR data and generates a report.  This temporary file is automatically 
deleted unless saved prior to exiting the program.  
2.3 CDR Analysis, Files, and Report 
Once the EDR data is collected, the CDR software performs an analysis and 
generates a report in the form of a *.cdr or *.pdf file. The *.cdr file contains the 
data displayed in the actual report, formatting data, and error checking data in the 
form of a hash value and field size counts.     
Three sources of data are contained within the *.cdr report file: user-entered data, 
computer-entered data (such as hash value, date and time, etc.), and EDR data.  
User-entered data includes information such as VIN, investigator’s name, case 
number, comments, etc.  With the exception of the comments field, user-entered 
fields contain a maximum of 64 characters. EDR-supplied data size depends on its 
storage capacity, and is indicated before the data appears by a size marker of two 
bytes.     
The hex data contains up to three hash values: two for program verification and 
one used by the software to ensure data has not been altered. The former is the 
Reporting Program Verification Number and the Collecting Program Verification 
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Number, both of which are displayed in the CDR report. In this example, the two 
are identical since the same version of the software was used for collection and 
reporting.  The latter is a hash value that appears toward the middle of the file itself 
and is not reported to the user.  
The actual EDR data from a GMC Sierra 1500 (see below) appears later in the file 
and is preceded by a size field. Here, the hexadecimal data DE 00 computes to 222 
bytes, which is the number of bytes stored on the EDR including the initial 
padding of six sets of zeros.  The reason for the padding is unknown.   
 
DE 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 91 17 00 00 A7 18 41 53 30 33 34 
30 4B 46 33 42 39 32 00 15 
 
76 31 80 A4 A6 A5 F8 AD 00 03 A4 34 80 84 81 85 70 FF 00 
FA FA FA FA FA FA FA 
 
FA FA FA FA FA FA FA FF 02 00 00 00 FF FF FF FF FF FF FF 
FF FF FF FF FF FF FF 
 
FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF 
FF FF FF FF FF FF FF  
 
FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF 
FF FF FF FF FF FF FF 
 
FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF 80 00 00 FF 80 FE FF BF FF 
FF FF FF FF FF FF FF  
 
FF FF 7C 04 03 01 01 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 FF FF FF 
FF FF 0A 10 00 61 70 
 
70 6E 6C 6A 00 80 00 00 73 73 73 73 00 20 20 20 20 20 00 
F8 25 FE 00 00 00 04 
 
00 FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF 
FF 
 
Two hash values are used to verify data which are created using a CRC 32 
function.  Based on experimentation, including attempts at data manipulation, it 
appears that the data is rehashed every time the CDR Tool is asked to open the 
document.  The hashes are then compared, and if they are not the same, an error is 
expunged to the user and the program exits. 
Although the .cdr file format appears to be simple, there is no public description of 
it and no method to review fields within the CDR software.  Additionally, the 
current software version does not display any verification numbers, checksums, or 
hash values. Indeed, the hash value can only be found by looking at the native 
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format of the report with a hex editor. Such information has been recognized as 
necessary in properly executed digital forensics investigations when handling 
electronic evidence.  
3. EDRS AS EVIDENCE 
EDR data is typically only in cases where an automobile accident figures 
prominently, although sometimes this evidence can be included as a part of a larger 
investigation. This type of data is increasingly considered as a part of other types 
of investigations, since electronic devices such as EDRs are enjoying more 
prominence in court proceedings in recent history. Indeed, many EDRs can 
provide information relevant to other aspects of an investigation, such as GPS data, 
that can assist investigators outside of the realm of automobile accidents. However, 
current techniques for removing and preserving automobile data do not meet the 
standards for electronic evidence as outlined by the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The court system has generally recognized data from EDRs during 
trial.  
There are a number of benchmark cases in which EDR data was ruled as 
admissible and reliable [4]. Many of these cases involved airbag product 
defect/negligence, including v. General Motors Corp where EDR data was 
admitted after a Frye hearing which was upheld by the appellate court [6]. Several 
of the airbag cases used EDR data to prove that non-deployment was proper, 
including Cansler v. General Motors Corporation [14], Batiste v. General Motors 
Corporation [15], and Sipes v. General Motors Corporation [16]. Several other 
important cases addressing the issue of EDR data reliability include criminal cases 
of manslaughter and homicide that occurred during accidents [4]. In most of these 
cases, including People v Muscarnera [11], Matos v State of Florida [12], and 
People v Hopkins [13], it was determined that a Frye hearing was not necessary 
and that EDR evidence is reliable as a matter of law and as it is generally accepted 
by the scientific community. Since EDRs have only recently been used in 
automobiles, their use as evidence in court cases has only occurred in the last ten to 
fifteen years.   
Although most of the cases involving dismissal of EDR data have occurred due to 
process issues, i.e., the lack of a search warrant, the presence of discrepancies and 
lack of authentication for EDR data opens the door for acquittals or overturned 
verdicts. This GMC Sierra EDR experiment indicates unresolved issues with data 
authenticity, necessitating the use of “best evidence” practices until a better 
solution can be implemented.  
As with any evidence handling, proper and well-documented chain of custody is a 
critical first step. A stopgap solution to many evidentiary issues with EDRs 
includes the corroboration of any electronic findings with physical evidence. 
3.1 Missing and Uninterpreted Data  
The information presented in the CDR report is both difficult to understand and 
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often inconsistent. First, the downloaded data is present in hexadecimal format, 
which proves to be of little use to the investigator. Additionally, the software’s 
conversion of the hexadecimal data into a human-readable format cannot be 
independently verified due to the program’s closed source nature. Also, the 
displayed hex data is incomplete.  
Second, the memory register numbers are not sequential, and there are missing 
segments in the data.  Registers are the physical locations in the memory chip 
where information is stored. The registers from the 2001 GMC Sierra 1500 contain 
6 bytes of data, but investigation of other EDRs show that they have fewer. There 
is no reason given for this difference in the associated documentation, and there 
appear to be missing segments of these registers in the hex data that is output into 
the report. It is unclear whether the registers simply do not contain any 
information, which seems unlikely due to the lack of the FF sequence.   
Additionally, the *.cdr report printout displays data not converted by the program, 
which is presumed to be proprietary manufacturer information (i.e., airbag 
deployment thresholds). When a sniffer was deployed to monitor data transfer 
from the CDR to the file, discrepancies were noted on each pass. The system’s 
method of choosing or inserting data is unknown, making it difficult to determine 
the effectiveness and repeatability of these results. Since repeatability of a 
particular process is a crucial component of any information being considered as 
evidence, this presents a problem.  
3.2 Data Collection Standards 
In comparing the hexadecimal data from the three data dump passes, discrepancies 
were found between each pass in the form of differing bytes.   It was noted that 
multiple downloads performed in short order caused the number of discrepancies 
increased. The changed bytes were found in the first portion of the download from 
the CDR Interface Module.     
The CDR software was run six different times with a “sniffer” in place in order to 
determine consistency of results. Each run contains three different passes, and the 
information sent to the CDR Interface Module was recorded for each pass of each 
run. The sniffer found discrepancies between the passes within a run. However, the 
information presented to the user in the final report was the same. This is likely due 
to the algorithm used by the program, which is difficult to determine due to the 
proprietary nature of these tools.  
Surprisingly, the *.cdr file does not contain the actual three passes that are 
collected from the EDR. The implication is that the CDR software deletes the 
original EDR data once the “final version” of the report is complete.  
All of these issues cast doubt on both the repeatability and the validity of data from 
any particular run of the software. Consistency is a key component of the Daubert 
standards for admissibility of scientific evidence in a court of law. As such, the 
aforementioned discrepancies are a cause for concern when being presented as 
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evidence in legal proceedings.  
3.3 Multiple Locations for Data  
EDRs are not the only source of valuable crash reconstruction data in automobiles. 
Indeed, vehicles may contain multiple Electronic Control Modules to control the 
different higher–level functions (i.e. ABS, Traction Control, and Power Train).  
Car manufacturers have taken both central and distributed approaches to storing 
such data. GM records all pre-crash information in the SDM, but Ford separates 
data two different modules: the Restraint Control Module (RCM) and the 
Powertrain Control Module (PCM).  
Ford’s RCM makes the airbag deployment decisions and executes necessary 
system diagnostics.  In the event of an accident, the RCM will typically record 
acceleration data, cumulative velocity change (Delta V), seatbelt usage, and other 
restraint information: GM stores similar information in an EDR. Ford additionally 
records vehicle speed, brake and throttle usage, and other related information in a 
PCM, but only on post–2003 vehicles installed with Electronic Throttle Control 
(ETC).  The primary function of the PCM is to run engine diagnostics while 
controlling fuel–air mixture and spark.  In Ford vehicles, this data was only 
retrievable from the factory until the recent introduction of support in the Bosch 
CDR tool. 
The Ford PCM continuously records data in a circular buffer capable of holding 25 
seconds of data recorded in 200 ms intervals.  When the 25 second limit is reached, 
the data is rewritten starting at the initial memory location.  In the event of a crash, 
data is written for an additional 5 seconds, assuming power has not been 
interrupted.  
Since the PCM has no accelerometer or air bag deployment logic, it relies on a bit 
called the “RDI_FLG” originating from the RCM. If the RDI_FLG bit is set to 1 
then an airbag deployment has been commanded. If the RDI_FLG is 0, then the 
airbag status is not deployed or unknown. The data is cannot be overwritten for a 
predetermined number of key cycles, or in the event of power applied to the unit. If 
power loss occurs during a crash, all recording to the PCM will stop. The data is 
not locked and can be overwritten upon the next application of power.  
Because of this, Ford warns investigators that PCM data can be lost if the vehicle 
ignition cylinder is turned to the on position, so investigators should never attempt 
to utilize the vehicle’s power system. This presents a challenge for digital forensics 
specialists since a very detailed accounting of the status of the PCM is required to 
generate acceptable evidence in court. 
A complete examination and interpretation of the data contained in the Ford 
modules is available by sending the modules to Ford (at a cost). There, engineers 
retrieve the data and send back a report. Currently, authentication of the data is 
performed by evidence technicians, which includes matching the modules to the 
vehicle. Some PCM’s do not contain any vehicle identification information, which 
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may raise the scepter of doubt in a trial setting [10].  
3.4 Unknown Methods 
The final data produced in the report is passed through an algorithm prior to being 
displayed to the investigator.  As stated at the front of the CDR report generated by 
the software:  
Once the crash data is downloaded, the CDR tool mathematically 
adjusts the recorded algorithm forward velocity data to generate an 
adjusted algorithm forward velocity change that may more closely 
approximate the forward velocity change ... The SDM Adjusted 
Algorithm Forward Velocity Change may not closely approximate 
what the sensing system experienced in all types of events.  
There is no description of the algorithm or how it knows what is “more closely 
approximate” to what the vehicle experienced.  The ability to determine speed at 
the time of a car accident is a key piece of data during crash reconstruction. The 
lack of information regarding the specific algorithm applied here prompts 
questions about the exactness of the determination made by the software, which 
could lead to questionable acceleration calculations. 
3.5 Evidence Identifier  
Initially it was presumed the CDR software used information from the VIN, World 
Manufacturer Identifier, Vehicle Attributes, and Model Year (MY) to determine 
what type and version of the EDR was being read.  
However, it was discovered that any information could be entered as long as the 
World Manufacturer Identifier corresponded to a manufacturer supported by the 
CDR and followed the VIN formatting requirements (see Figure 2) [2]. This opens 
the door for incorrect information to be easily inserted into the fields that identify 
evidence.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
World 
Manufacturer 
Identifier 
Vehicle Attributes Check Digit MY 
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
Plant Code Sequential Number 
Figure 1 - VIN Breakdown for Vehicle Manufacturers Producing 500+ Cars per Year 
3.6 Clean Source Media 
In the most egregious exception to evidentiary requirements, there are no 
indications that the CDR Interface Module memory is wiped between downloads.  
During experimentation, power was applied to the CDR Interface Module and a 
request was made for the data in memory before performing a download of an 
EDR.  At initial power-up, it seems that the CDR Interface Module memory is set 
to unknown predefined data, which is available for download as authentic data.   
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4. FUTURE WORK 
The aforementioned pitfalls of the CDR software can be addressed by applying 
longstanding digital forensics principals and methodologies to crash 
reconstruction. Although the collection of automobile data for the purposes of 
accident reconstruction is a relatively new field, many lessons can be taken from 
the evolution of the digital forensics process, as well as the recovery of black box 
data from airline accidents. It is relatively simple to apply the same process of 
creating and displaying a hash value for collected data and implementing the 
currently required chain of custody documentation to automobile data collection 
events.  
The type of computers and amount of data available for automobiles varies widely 
when compared to the standard laptop or desktop computers, or for smaller digital 
devices such as cell phones and PDAs. Automobile records currently store only a 
minute amount of information, 1 kilobyte or less, which serves to simplify the 
length of the collection process. Many of the standard digital forensics tools could 
be used on automobiles, or less cumbersome programs could be implemented due 
to the small amount of data being analyzed.  
Legislation has been proposed to mandate a common set of information recorded 
on all model year 2011 vehicles and later. In the event of such legislation, sound 
practices and procedures must be in place in order to most effectively transition to 
the widespread use of such information in legal proceedings.  
The possibilities for future work in the field of accident reconstruction are 
significant. Performing these type of data-dump experiments for a variety of 
additional automobiles would likely lend both new questions and possibly some 
answers to data discrepancies. Identification of automotive systems beyond those 
identified by Bosch including EDRs and ECMs other than those used by GM or 
Ford would go a long way towards the ability to reconstruct a variety of accidents. 
Additionally, it is important to develop techniques to decode the data obtained 
from the different vehicle systems without the use of proprietary decoders.  
The necessity to provide some kind of authentication for automobile data is critical 
for the use of this information in court. Many of the steps taken in this process 
require more significant data verification, which is one of the most important 
components of the future of automobile accident reconstruction. 
5. CONCLUSION 
Currently, digital evidence extraction from automobiles is not conducted with the 
same rigor as with more traditional digital forensics applications. This paper 
addresses some of these current shortcomings, specifically in the data collection 
technique. Lessons learned from the fields of airline crash investigations and 
digital forensics can provide models for the future of the EDR data handling in the 
accident reconstruction industry.   
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